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Angola`s Geopolitical Dilemma:
Between the African “Heartland” 
and the South Atlantic
ELI ALVES PENHA
“Peoples of Africa must be the masters of their own destinies”
Agostinho Neto
1 INTRODUÇÃO
The African continent comprises 541 countries, 22 of them 
bordering the South Atlantic Ocean. As a result of an arbitrary divi-
sion imposed by European colonial rule everywhere in Africa, the 
strong fragmentation observed in the African Atlantic coast may 
have been caused by the geographical proximity of Europe and the 
pre-existence of naval support bases and commercial networks, 
that together represented competitive factors in the struggle to 
dominate the area.
Historically, Africa fully fit the European colonial interests in the 
two eras of capitalist development: during mercantilism, provid-
ing slaves for “civilizing” America; and within the context of the 
second industrial revolution – when slavery was completely over-
taken by free labor in American countries – through the division of 
the continent in dozens of territories for the exclusive production 
of agricultural and extractive products. In this case, even after the 
decolonization of the 1960`s and 70`s, agricultural monocultures 
continued to be a practice in many African countries in order to 
serve the European market.
In the 21st century, another “Scramble for Africa” took place, 
focusing on the exploration of strategic natural resources and 
off-shore oil production. The basin of the Congo River, Southern 
Africa and the Gulf of Guinea are the targets of the major powers. 
China, for instance, has invested billions of dollars in infrastructure 
1 Fifty-five countries, depending on criterion of classification of the western 
Sahara: to the African Union it is a country; to the UN it is an autonomous 
territory, contested by Morocco and the Polisario Front.
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development in the continent as a counterpart for the exploration of 
natural resources. Besides China, other countries with a strong pres-
ence are the United States of America, France, Brazil, India and Japan.
Angola, possessing a vast territory and placed amid the rich-
est regions of the continent, has an important role in Africa`s new 
geopolitics. With a territorial extension of 1,246,700 km² (the second 
largest territory in Atlantic Africa), the Angolan territory comprises 
countless mineral resources and vast fertile soil in river plains and 
upland areas over 1,000m. The long continental borderline (4,837 
km) marks the limits of the country with its neighbors, the Republic 
of the Congo and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly 
Zaire) in the North, Zambia in the East and Namibia in the South, 
indicating regionally diversified diplomatic relations.
In the maritime context, its shoreline is 1,650 km long, the 
longest one in the African continent, ahead of Namibia (1,572 km) 
and Nigeria (850 km). The country`s Exclusive Economic Zone, 
with 518,433 km², includes large stocks of fishery resources and 
a wealth of oil, explored in large amounts in the northern coast of 
the country near the mouth of the Congo River.
Having an annual average growth of 11.1% between 2001 
and 2011, Angola is considered as one of the most expressive 
examples of the so-called “African renaissance” (PEREIRA, 2011, 
p.185). Their strong economic growth helped to drive their role as 
a regional dynamo being capable of investing even in their former 
metropolis, Portugal, currently suffering a strong economic crisis 
and dependent on Angolan investments.
These facts contrast with the troubled history experienced 
by the country, up to recent times. Angola was the most long-
lived European colony (since 1482) and one of the last countries 
to conquer their independence (1975). The country still had to 
overcome one of the longest civil wars in Africa (1976-2002) the 
war between the government of the Popular Movement for the 
Liberation of Angola (Movimento para a Libertação de Angola – 
MPLA) and the leading oppositional force of the Angolan Nationalist 
Movement (União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola 
– UNITA). In this conflict, foreign powers – USA, URSS, Cuba – and 
regional powers like Zaire and South Africa were involved.
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The results of the Angolan internal policies influenced the 
region positively, as shown by their key role in the struggle against 
the apartheid in South Africa, in the independence of Zimbabwe 
and Namibia, besides military aid to help in the fall of the dictator 
of Zaire Mobutu Sese Seku. In this sense, consolidation of a time 
for peace and security, internally, made it possible for the country 
to launch a Project of international insertion through regional inte-
gration and South-South (JOVETA, 2012) cooperation.
Nowadays, Angola has to face the problem of ensuring security 
of their terrestrial and maritime borders, at the same time. In both, 
they face immense challenges. On the continental side, conflicts 
in Central Africa represent a potential risk factor for the stability 
of the national political system. On the maritime side, technologi-
cal and military difficulties make the country vulnerable to threats 
from piracy and the advances of the major powers, avidly inter-
ested in the rich natural resources of the country.
In this text, the aim is to investigate how Angola has faced this 
dilemma, considering its position joining the African heartland and 
the South Atlantic. In order to better understand the issue, I intend 
to analyze the different historical contexts of the country: the shap-
ing of Angolan borders during the colonial period; the conflict for 
the control of resources after their independence and the promi-
nence of Angola to consolidate the new regionalisms during the 
civil post-war period.
 
2 PORTUGUESE COLONIAL RULE AND THE EXPANSION 
OF ANGOLAN BORDERS
The Portuguese were the first Europeans to sail everywhere 
on the African coast. Since 1419, they established commercial 
and naval support points aiming at the control of the “India Run”. 
The circumnavigation of the African coast by the Portuguese (see 
Figure 1 below) allowed the sub-Saharan Africa to have its bound-
aries mapped before being effectively colonized. The absence of 
good natural ports, the difficulty of proceeding inland from the 
great Rivers (the Congo River, for instance, is navigable up to 150 
km from the coast line), and the fact that commercial enslaving 
activities were their best business, delayed the project of effective 
colonization  of Africa to the end of the  19th century.
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Figure 1: World Discovery by Portugal
Source: Castro (1982).
To the Angolan people, at that time part of the Kingdom of 
Congo, the first contact with the Portuguese was in the year 1482 
when a Portuguese fleet, having Diogo Cão as commander, arrived 
at the mouth of the Congo River. This episode marks the beginning 
of the long process of colonization in the history of the country, 
having the South Atlantic as the first platform of domination and 
conquest of the territory.
The process of colonization began with the evangelizing 
missions and, later on, with military expeditions. The main mari-
time support point for the Portuguese was the entrance of the 
Kwanza River, main waterway of communication between the 
coast and the inland region. Through the river, they could negoti-
ate trade deals with the Ngola (“King” in the Bantu language), term 
that would later be used to name the country (SANTOS, 1996). 
Up to the end of the 18th century, the Portuguese limited their 
presence only to specific points on the coast, like Luanda and 
Benguela, ports where regular transportation of slaves to Brazil 
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was done. Thanks to their alliances with the Congolese kingdom, 
establishing these strategic points on the coast represented one of 
the first Portuguese initiatives to effectively occupy the whole of 
the Angolan territory.
Therefore, the development of a kind of economy based on 
slavery in Brazil was  an important boost to occupy the area: as 
the Brazilian demand for slave labor increased, penetration inland 
was more and more necessary in order to obtain slaves. In order to 
do so, a structure of intermediation was set up between the busi-
nessmen of the coast and the slave hunters, that searched for them 
inland in Angola. However, the Portuguese territorial expansion 
would only really occur in the context of the “Scramble for Africa”, 
marked by the Berlin Conference of 1884.2
The Berlin Conference divided Africa among the European 
countries and established military presence in conquered places 
as a requisite to maintain their domination. England and France 
kept the largest number of areas, due to expeditions organized 
by geographical societies of both countries that helped to define, 
starting from the sources of the big Rivers, the “areas of influence” 
on the land that each of them would possess in the continent.3 
These expeditions had explorers who became famous like Richard 
Francis Burton, David Livingston and Henry Stanley, of the “Royal 
2 According to Visentini (2012), the Berlin Conference represented 
intensification in the run for spheres of influence in Africa, prompted by the 
dispute between European capitalists and African States like Ashanti Benin 
and N’gola that fiercely controlled the export of palm, peanuts, cotton, gold 
and ivory. On account of the economic crisis of the decade of 1870, it was 
necessary to open trade for Europeans, and necessary to break control over 
access inland, so far maintained by coastal states.
3 It is interesting to observe that the colonization of Africa was urgent in the 
context of the increasing intensification of trading flows in the North-North 
sense, motivated by the construction of the Suez Canal (1869) initially, and 
later on the Panama Canal (1914). The construction of these two canals favored 
the creation of the Pan-Regions that, in Haushofer’s geopolitical conception, 
allowed an international division of labor formed by a central zone (head) 
and a periphery producing raw materials (body). In this respect, industrial 
development in the logical thinking of competitive capitalists implied opening 
direct trade to African products and European manufactured goods, but under 
territorial control. Thus, under the dogmas of “liberalism”, the African lands 
were transformed in spaces to produce monocultures in order to serve the 
industrialized economies of the European metropolises.
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Geographical Society” from London, and their work to identify the 
sources of the Nile, the Congo, and the Zambeze Rivers.
Portugal, to keep up with the “Scramble for Africa”, created the 
Society of Geography of Lisbon (Sociedade de Geografia de Lisboa) 
in 1875 to give support to the exploratory expeditions. Thus, between 
1877 and 1885, the Portuguese geographers Hermenegildo Capelo, 
Serpa Pinto and Roberto Ivens crossed Africa from Luanda to Tete 
(Mozambique’s central region), mapping the territory and exploring 
the Cuango, the Congo and the Zambeze Rivers. The result of the 
expedition was the Central and Southern African Charter, known 
as the “Rose-colored Map”, that claimed for Portugal a contiguous 
strip of land from the South Atlantic up to the Indian Ocean, that 
is, joining Angola to Mozambique (NOWELL, 1982). Figure 2 below 
represents the Central and Southern African Charter, as proposed 
by the Portuguese at the conference.
Figura 2: Map of the Portuguese central and Southern Africa
Source: Penha (2015).
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In a doctorate thesis entitled A Seção da Sociedade de Geografia 
de Lisboa no Brasil e o Sonho de um Novo Império Africano, 
Cristina Mary tells that the expeditions organized by the Society 
of Geography of Lisbonne showed the interest that the Portuguese 
had to expand their territorial domination, beyond the strip of 
land on the coast that until that time was characteristic of their 
presence in the African continent. They intended to make their 
Portuguese possessions in the African continent a “new Brazil”. 
They clearly intended to occupy and settle these areas, particularly 
from Angola to Mozambique, and their ambition was to intercon-
nect the Atlantic and the Indian Oceans. (MARY, 2010).
This project of interoceanic connection would be blocked by 
England, through what was known  as the diplomatic “British 
Ultimatum”(1890). In this case, England not only rejected the 
Portuguese plans, but it also demanded the immediate withdrawal 
of their military forces of the territories of the former Rhodesia, 
current Zambia and Zimbabwe.
At that time, the world lived under the aegis of the pax britan-
nica of maritime and commercial hegemony. In Africa, England 
aimed at the construction of a railroad to connect the city of Cairo 
to the Cape of Good Hope. Conceived by Cecil Rhodes, the railway 
would form a “red line”to link the English possessions from north 
to south, facilitating colonization  and control of trade networks 
all over the continent. Another objective they had was the control 
of all the interoceanic maritime passages. Besides the sea corri-
dor between the Atlantic and the Indian Oceans, favored by the 
control of the Cape Route, England started to use the Suez Canal 
(from 1882 on)4 as a decisive factor to strenghten the monopoly 
of their maritime commerce between the Indian Ocean and the 
Mediterranean Sea. These would be the objective reasons to 
explain the fierce English opposition to the Portuguese plans of 
creating a continental corridor to link the Atlantic and the Indian 
Oceans (RAMOS, 2009).
4 The Suez Canal, built by France in 1869 and handed over to the British in 1882.
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The outcome of this diplomatic clash was the recognition by 
the Portuguese of the English rule on the territories of Rhodesia 
(currently Zambia and Zimbabwe) in a common agreement 
between the parts. From 1891 on, the Portuguese began the 
process of demarcation of Angolan borders, largely marked by 
hydrographic basins, having its last mark laid down in 1926 in a 
common agreement with the government of the Union of South 
Africa, respecting the border line between the province and the 
territory of southwestern Africa (currently Namibia), at the time of 
the South African Mandate (SOARES, 2014).
3 INDEPENDENCE AND CONFLICT OVER CONTROL OF 
TERRITORIAL RESOURCES 
After its independence in 1975, Angola inherits from the 
Portuguese a territory of 1,246,700 km², formed by the basins of 
the Kwanza, Kunene, Congo, Cubango/Okavango and Zambezi 
rivers, the latter ones representing potential physiographic factors 
of regional integration.
The Kwanza River may be called the “river of national inte-
gration”. It starts in the Bié province on the Angolan Plateau and 
ends at its delta on the Atlantic, approximately 50 km south of 
Luanda. Being 960 km long, the Kwanza is navigable for 258 km 
from its mouth to the inland region. There, the Cambambe and 
the Capanda dams were built and they produce large part of the 
electric power consumed in Luanda. The dams also provide water 
for irrigation of sugar cane plantations and other cultures in the 
Kwanza Valley (ANGOLAN EMBASSY, 2014).
The river valley offers the only easy access inland in a region 
known as “The Plateau”, considered the granary of the country, 
on account of its diversity and large agricultural productivity. With 
an average height of 1,000-1,700 meters above sea level, it has 
the Moco Hill in the Huambo Province as its highest peak, 2,620 
meters high.
The Kwanza Valley and the Central Plateau are the home of the 
two predominant ethnic groups in Angola: the Kimbundu (25%) 
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and the Ovimbundu (37%) respectively.5 The third important group 
is the Bacongo (13%), who lives in the northern coast of the coun-
try and in the Cabinda enclave, to the north of the mouth of the 
Congo River. The ethnic groups of the country became pivotal 
to the movements of national liberation, formed respectively by 
UNITA, the MPLA, and the National Liberation Front of Angola 
(Frente Nacional pela Libertação de Angola – FNLA). Figure 3 
below shows the distribution of these ethnic groups and natural 
riches in the Angolan territory.
Figure 3: Spatial distribution of ethnic groups and natural wealth of Angola
Source: Lacoste (1995) and 18th in a series... (2012). Organized by the author.
5 According to the Angolan National Statistical Office (Instituto de Estatística de 
Angola – INE), Angola had in 2013, 19,183,590 million people. Large part of its 
population lives on coastal regions, above all in Luanda, where it is estimated 
that eight million people live, almost half of the country’s population. (info-
angola.ao).
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In the year of the country’s independence (1975), the MPLA 
seized control of the Angolan State and defined, as an initial stra-
tegic aim, the avoidance of a common border for Bacongos and 
Ovimbundus to share because this would facilitate an alliance 
between the FNLA and UNITA against the MPLA government. 
From the MPLA’s perspective, if such an alliance would occur the 
Bacongos would assume control of the oil deposits found in the 
region and the Ovimbundus would have the food produced in their 
rich agricultural soil. The alliance of the two groups, combining 
economic power and size of population, would be a decisive factor 
to seize the State and conquer victory (18TH IN A SERIES…, 2012).
However, the MPLA government counted on a strong asset: it 
dominated the capital Luanda, that had been the seat of the colo-
nial government and represented a powerful center of administra-
tive and military command. Besides, it counted on the support of 
Cuban troops, highly skilled to act in war conflicts in Africa and 
firmly engaged in the Angolan revolutionary process. The result 
was the first major victory of the MPLA government tthat forced 
the FNLA to retreat to its support base in Zaire (LACOSTE, 1995).
After establishing control over the land of the Bacongos, 
the MPLA finally reached control over the Angolan offshore oil 
production,6 helping the government achieve valuable resources 
to continue fighting with another rival group, much stronger than 
the FNLA: UNITA, whose leader was Jonas Savimbi. In search 
of support from the Lunda people, who lived in the northeast of 
Angola, close to the border of Zaire, UNITA took over control of the 
alluvial diamond deposits found in the Lunda provinces.
Alluvial diamonds have an advantage, they can be extracted 
manually by low-skilled workers and, besides, they have a high 
market value, and this is ideal for smuggling and exchanging 
them for weapons and ammunition. On the other hand, alluvial 
6  In Angola, oil became a major lever for the development of the country, 
bringing economic and technological gains. However, these gains have not 
reached society as a whole: 36% live under the poverty line and unemployment 
reaches 26% of the population. In order to revert the situation, the Angolan 
government has been following the principle of progressive reduction of the 
dependency of economy in relation to oil and diamonds, through applying what 
exceeds in qualifying human capital and developing economic sectors in the 
intensive use of workforce (JOVETA, 2012).
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diamonds are characterized by their dispersion of deposits and 
the low amount found in these deposits. As the war went on, the 
UNITA guerrilla fighters had to disperse themselves a lot in order 
to search for them, becoming more vulnerable to the MPLA forc-
es increasingly better equipped and hawkish. At the beginning of 
the 2000 decade, the MPLA forces managed to take control of the 
Lunda lands, dispersing and destroying the UNITA forces (18TH IN 
A SERIES…, 2012).
Even though he had lost their bases at the Lunda provinces and 
the diamonds that financed the guerrilla, Jonas Savimbi had rather 
go on fighting and was only stopped by his death in 2002. From 
then on, UNITA began to negotiate peace with the MPLA and the 
war was finally over.
For the MPLA, victory over UNITA meant final control over the 
country’s diamonds, fostering a new revenue stream for MPLA and 
they were the only ones – with greater funds and access to foreign 
markets – who would be able to deal with it. In the African concert, 
Angola is the third diamond producer, with eight million carats 
each year, behind Botswana and the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
quantitatively, and Botswana and South Africa, in terms of qual-
ity. The diamond resources were important factors in the engage-
ment of Zaire and South Africa in the Angolan conflict. Zaire was a 
major producer of diamonds also and the South-African company 
De Beers, that became famous in the 80’s with their advertising 
campaign “diamonds are forever”, reached control of 90% of the 
high quality diamond trade in the world.
4 THE PIVOTAL POSITION OF ANGOLA IN CENTRAL AND 
SOUTHERN AFRICA 
“Angola is and will always be the firm trench 
of revolution in Africa; In Rodhesia, in South 
Africa and  in Namibia lies the continuity of our 
struggle”. 
The above statement, from president Agostinho Neto 
(1975-1979) said after the country’s independence, summa-
rized the Angolan government intention to confront in military 
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terms countries that would be hostile to their political regime 
(VAN-DUNEN, 2010).
Located between Southern and Central Africa, scene of the 
main conflicts engendered by the “Cold War”, Angola faced fierce 
opposition from its neighbors, that considered its socialist govern-
ment a serious threat to regional “stability”. Countries like Zaire 
and South Africa, overtly supported the groups opposed to the 
MPLA, particularly Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA.
Zaire, under the dictatorship of Mobuto Sese Seku (1965-1997), 
received strong financial and military support from the USA, France 
and Belgium. Claiming that he was fighting pro-Soviet regimes, 
Mobuto tried to intervene in Angolan politics, whether support-
ing Portuguese colonial rule  in wars of independence, or support-
ing groups opposed to the Marxist government of the MPLA. This 
support consisted in providing armaments and helping assemble 
commercial networks for diamonds, smuggled along 2,511 km of 
the Angolan northern border. Covered by forested savannas, with-
out military protection, this border region served as an ideal shel-
ter for UNITA’s rearguard attacks (FRANCISCO, 2013).
South Africa, in turn, was the most hostile country against the 
MPLA government. From military bases stationed in the South 
African territory of Southwestern Africa (current Namibia), in 
Angola’s southern border, South Africa trained the UNITA forces 
and launched attacks on Angolan territory, causing serious damag-
es to the country’s economic structures. Allegation for the attacks 
was that Angola sheltered forces that were hostile to the South 
African government, like the members of the South West Africa 
People’s Organization (SWAPO) and those of the African National 
Congress (ANC), including the present-day South African President 
Jacob Zuma, for his struggle against the apartheid.
Another allegation, the same one used by Zaire, was the need 
to stop communist advances in the region, but what was peculiar 
was the role of South Africa as guardian of the western Christian 
values in the region. Through a discourse of that kind, South Africa 
gained support of American leaders, especially Donald Trump, 
who led a massive anti-communist crusade in Africa during the 
80’s (PENHA, 1998).
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However, in Zaire as well as in South Africa, the Angolan forc-
es with military cooperation of other countries, acted decisively 
to win their victory and beat their respective regimes. In the first 
case, between 1996 and 1997 the first Congo war began. President 
Mobuto, without Western support due to a new world context with 
the end of the communist threat, lost power and sought asylum 
in Morocco. The Angolan troops, together with those of Rwanda, 
Burundi and Uganda, invaded the country to support the new 
government of Laurent Kabila (1997-2001). This was only the 
beginning of a set of military operations that the Angolans started 
to carry out in Central Africa, claiming to ensure greater regional 
stability16 (CASTELLANO DA SILVA, 2011).
In the case of South Africa, the battle of Cuito Cuanavale was 
decisive to defeat the racist regime in the country. In this battle, 
that happened between 15/11/1987 and 23/03/1988, the South 
African armed forces and armed groups from UNITA confronted 
the Cuban army and the Angolan forces of the MPLA. The result 
of the agreements, reached after the Angolan victory, was the 
immediate withdrawal of the South African and Cuban troops 
from Angola. The next step was the independence of Namibia, that 
occurred on March 21, 1990.
Regarding this battle, the then President Nelson Mandela said: 
“Cuito Cuanavale was the turning point in the struggle for libera-
tion of our continent and my people from the scourge of apartheid” 
(Mills, 2006). Madiba’s words reminded Fidel Castro’s speech at the 
Non-Aligned Summit in Harare, in 1986. At the time, the Cuban 
leader assured that the Cuban troops would stay in Angola until the 
end of the Apartheid (JOVETA, 2012). The promise was fulfilled, and 
later on recognition was achieved: at Nelson Mandela’s memorial 
service, in Pretoria, Barack Obama, the first Afro-American presi-
dent of the USA, greeted the Cuban leader Raul Castro.
Bilateral relations between Angola and South Africa during 
Mandela’s presidential period (1994 – 1999) were quite fruitful, 
but during Thabo Mbeki’s government (1999 – 2008) there were 
differences, particularly in relation to what the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) should do about the conflicts 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Angola, Namibia and 
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Zimbabwe favored military intervention with the approval of the 
African Union and the UN, but South Africa did not agree.
Angola has given special attention to regional security as a 
fundamental means to secure internal order, and this may explain 
its interventionist role in Central Africa. One example was the 
participation of Angolan special forces in the Republic of Congo to 
help overthrow ex-president Pascal Lissouba and support the pres-
ent-day president Denis Sassou Nguesso’s inauguration. Lissouba 
supported UNITA during the 90’s, and fear persists that DRC and 
Republic of Congo may eventually support the Bacongo separat-
ists of the Angolan enclave of Cabinda. In this case, the presence 
of Angolan security forces in Cabinda is not only to control the 
Bacongo separatists, but to intimidate their neigghbors as well 
(Stratford, 2012).
Generally speaking, there is consensus among the countries 
of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), 
an organization Angola belongs to since 1999, of the need to join 
forces to reduce and solve the conflicts in Central Africa. Reflecting 
upon it, these countries tried to develop integrative security 
sectors in their institution like the Peace and Security Council 
(PSC), the Defense and Security Division (DSD), the Central African 
Multinational Force (FOMAC), and the Rapid Response Mechanism 
of Central Africa (REACH) (JOVETA, 2012).
In Southern Africa, good diplomatic relations with Jacob Zuma`s 
government have allowed both countries to work together in order 
to keep the southern region as a politically stable zone and foster 
further integration in the context of the SADC. However, there is 
fear of seeing Angola develop strong regional influence to rival 
South Africa. 
As far as capital assets are concerned, South Africa is the rich-
est country in the continent. It also possesses large deposits of 
gold and diamonds, a great industrial complex and large popu-
lations that make this country unrivalled in the region. Besides, 
South Africa has expanded its powerful influence around great 
part of Central and Southern Africa, through financing road and 
railroad projects to link the countries of the region to African ports 
(PENHA, 1998).
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Angola is the only SADC country to build its railroad system 
separately from South Africa. Nowadays, thanks to resourc-
es derived from oil and diamonds, it has tried to obtain greater 
influence on the hinterland. In cooperation with China, it devel-
ops investment projects of billions of dollars in roads and ports, 
exerting a powerful appeal on Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe. In 
addition, Angola has a large amount of oil, a natural resource that 
South Africa and other countries in the region do not have.
Currently, with 1,9 million barrels a day, the country is one of 
the largest producers in Africa, along with Nigeria and Sudan. The 
location of the deposits, added to the capacity of its production, 
placed the country in the regional system of the Gulf of Guinea, 
bringing to it deep geopolitical deployments.
5 OIL AND ANGOLA`S PROJECTION IN THE GULF OF GUINEA 
Geographically, the Gulf of Guinea is defined as an indenta-
tion of the western coast of Africa with ill-defined contour, but 
characterized by similar climate, landscape and culture. From a 
geopolitical viewpoint, it has been conceived as a region of rich oil 
resources extending from Nigeria to Angola.
The Angolan diplomat Eduardo Beny (2007), reported that a 
new geopolitics about oil is being conceived, with gradual transfer 
from the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Guinea as the new center of oil 
production and all of the potential conflicts it entails. Geographic 
proximity of other consumer centers and the fact of having the oil 
deposits relatively far from the coast may be facilitating factors 
for control by the major world powers. Geostrategically, Ascension 
Island would function as a platform tailored to project its power in 
a similar way to the Island of Diego Garcia on the Indian Ocean.
The USA, aware of the importance of the region for their energy 
security, developed a Project called Gulf of Guinea Guard, antici-
pating that African oil supply to the United States would increase, 
from the current 15% to a level between 25% and 35%, until 2020. 
The main objectives of this Project are: improve physical security 
of the ports in the region; foster collective security and maritime 
cooperation; establish a communication network and control of 
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the movement of ships (located in the São Tome and Príncipe 
Islands); and exert control more directly in Angola and Nigeria, 
two great oil producers of major regional influence (BENY, 2007).
In spite of their interest in Angola, the USA never hid their 
disapproval of the MPLA government. When the Angolan President 
appealed to the international community to help rebuild the coun-
try, right after the end of the civil war, the USA refused claiming 
that the government had not been transparent on the legal report-
ing about production and sale of oil and diamonds. On the other 
hand, China and Brazil quickly answered their request to invest in 
the reconstruction of the country. As a first step, Brazil provided 
help to finish the works in the hydroelectric plant of Capanda that 
had been stopped due to the war in the country (JOVETA, 2012).
Angola is China’s largest trading partner in Africa since 2008, 
with trade making an estimated 25 billion dollars, large part based 
on oil trade (FERNANDES, 2011). In this sense, oil became a key 
element in bilateral trade: credits for infrastructure revert to oil; 
trade is dominated by oil imports; and China’s considerable invest-
ments in the country are directed to the oil industry (FERNANDES, 
2011).
The importance of oil to the development of the Angolan soci-
ety and national interest in exploring and controlling the deposits 
of oil located in its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), theoretically 
implies that the country, increasingly, tends to embody the mari-
time dimension in State policies, whether building the proper naval 
means or in the accomplishment of maritime security policies.
However, the Angolan naval establishment – consisting of 
1,000 marines, 11 coastal boats and four patrol vessels – does not 
look sufficient to ensure effective security of its maritime inter-
ests. This may explain the fact that the country searches Nigeria’s 
partnership, as Nigeria faces the same difficulties, in order to 
foster regional cooperation in maritime security. The Gulf of 
Guinea Commission (GGC) was one of the results of this partner-
ship. Suggested by Nigeria in 1999, the GGC was only formalized 
in 2007, having as its main objectives the prevention and resolu-
tion of conflicts, definition of strategies of maritime security and 
management of oil resources.
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The initiative to create the GGC meant, first of all, awareness 
of the importance of the Gulf of Guinea as world producer of oil 
implying, as a consequence, a new regional and continental politi-
cal-strategic realignment. Figure 4 below shows the countries that 
are members of the GGC: Angola, Cameroon, Gabon, Republic of 
Equatorial Guinea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Republic 
of the Congo and São Tomé e Príncipe, GGC countries. Bringing 
together countries of central and western Africa, the GGC en bloc, 
produces more than five million barrels of oil per day   (ROYAL..., 
2012).
Figure 4: Gulf of Guinea Commission Signatory Countries.
Source: Penha (2015).
Angola assumed the presidency of GGC in 2008, committed to 
make the region a geopolitical space of strategic importance to the 
Central and Continental Africa’s scenario. The Angolan position 
was totally in line with the African Union precept that stated the 
regional groupings constituted essential links for an integrated and 
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supportive Africa. But it also results of the international acknowl-
edgement of the country’s ability in leading regional cooperative 
processes.
Angola’s prominence stems from three aspects. The first one 
has to do with the Nigerian difficulty in assuming the leadership 
of the commission within a context of crisis in international cred-
ibility, experienced by the “African giant”. The second aspect 
results from the country’s diplomatic activism well represented by 
President José Eduardo dos Santos, well accepted in the African 
political scene and recognized by his actions in favor of peace and 
stability in the region.
The third aspect conveys business reasons. The state-owned 
oil company “Sonangol” has served as an instrument for a 
successful process of “economic diplomacy”, through consultan-
cies in Lusophone countries and participation in the oil industry 
of other African countries. Internally, the company has created 
private economic groups and invested part of its profits in banks, 
insurance, air and sea transportation, telecommunications, etc. 
(JOVETA, 2012).
Therefore, Angola shows a profile of major stability and the 
best democratic credentials in the region. That is why pressure 
from western countries demanding greater responsibility in terms 
of security from Angola in the Gulf of Guinea has also increased, 
including the threat of withdrawing from the country investments 
of oil companies (ROYAL…, 2012).
To the western countries, the major threat to security regarding 
oil transportation and supply is piracy. The Gulf of Guinea has been 
considered one of the most dangerous regions of Africa because 
of maritime piracy and armed robbery against the ships (GUEDES, 
2013). It is estimated that between 2003 and 2011, 30% of the 
attacks in African waters happened in the Gulf of Guinea, mainly 
in Nigeria. The problem is getting to know to what extent the fight 
against piracy represents an entry to justify the intervention of the 
world powers in the region.
“Whoever has the Gulf of Guinea has in hands Africa”. The old 
colonial saying is remembered here to define the importance that 
the Gulf of Guinea has aroused among western countries. Besides 
ANGOLA`S GEOPOLITICAL DILEMMA:
BETWEEN THE AFRICAN “HEARTLAND” AND THE SOUTH ATLANTIC
TENSÕES MUNDIAIS, FORTALEZA, V. 12, N. 22, P. 177-202, 2016   |  195
oil and gas; the countries in this region are also rich in diamonds, 
gold, uranium, manganese, nickel, aluminium, cobalt and copper. 
Other important riches are the oil reserves of the pre-salt layer, the 
seabed minerals and the fishery resources in danger of depletion 
in other regions of the world. In terms of biodiversity the Congo 
basin is, after the Amazon basin, the second largest zone of humid 
forests, therefore equivalent to our Green Amazon.
That way, the strategic importance of the Gulf of Guinea can 
be seen in the larger context of the South Atlantic encompassing 
the South American coast that, together, have taken position as a 
new “border of resources” to the industrialized world. This border 
focuses on the Gulf of Guinea oil reserves and the Brazilian conti-
nental platform, estimated in 60 to 70 billion barrels on each side 
(PENHA, 2011b).
Angolan oil was the main factor of approximation with Brazil in 
the context of its independence in 1975. As the first country to recog-
nize the MPLA Marxist government, Brazil has also become one of 
the major trade partners of Angola with investments around US$ 4 
billion, above all in the area of large-size engineering and services.
Brazilian companies working in the country – Petrobras, Vale, 
the building companies Andrade Gutierrez, Camargo Correa, 
and Queiroz Galvão, are the ones that hire more Angolan work-
ers allowing the development of local skills and, consequently, of 
better quality of services and products (PENHA, 2011a).
Petrobras, due to its savoir-faire in the technology of oil explo-
ration in deep waters, has worked in mapping Angola’s pre-salt 
layer, as required by the Defense Minister Van-Dunen in 2010. The 
pre-salt layer is a layer of sedimentary rocks under the layer of 
salt at sea, formed in special paleogeographic conditions in the 
South Atlantic, with great potential to stock hydrocarbons. On the 
Angolan coast, the pre-salt layer is located between two and five 
thousand meters below sea level and it has an area similar to the 
Brazilian one, 700 kilometers long (CASTRO, 2010).
The mapping of the continental platform offers the possibility of 
proving the theory that says the Angolan and the Brazilian coasts 
are a kind of mirror of one another, according to Domingos Cunha 
who is responsible for Sonangol in Luanda. “The results we have 
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so far demonstrate the quality of oil is similar in Angola and in 
Brazil”, he said in a press interview. According to him, it is esti-
mated that oil production in Angola may double in the following 
15 years, considering that the Angolan pre-salt may have the same 
amount that is expected in Brazil – about 4 million barrels a day – 
on each side (ANGOLA APOSTA..., 2013).
According to Vice-Admiral Antonio Valentim (2007) of the 
Angolan Navy, in this way the offshore oil activities would increase 
the value of the South Atlantic from a geostrategic point of view. 
The presence of islands spread from Cape Verde, São Tome and 
Principe to the mid-ocean and Falkland, under British administra-
tion, reinforces the basin’s geostrategic importance and the ease 
of military control by maritime powers.
Therefore, it is in the geographical scope of the South Atlantic 
that Angola’s desire of ensuring a more extensive space of security 
and development can come true, thanks to its initiatives  of creat-
ing and revitalizing the Peace and Cooperation Zone in partner-
ship with Brazil.
6 THE ZOPACAS AND THE SOUTH ATLANTIC BASIN
The initiative to create the ZOPACAS became real as a 
Resolution by the General Assembly of the United Nations: nº 41/11 
of 27 October 1986. The main objective of this resolution was to 
promote peace and cooperation among the peoples of the south 
Atlantic region, or peace as a major objective and cooperation as 
an instrument or a means to achieve this final goal. Appearing in 
the context of the “cold war” to oppose the project of militarization 
suggested by South Africa, Argentina and the United States, the 
ZOPACAS suffered strong undermining since the nineties in the 
context of economic globalization.
However, in the nineties, Angola made a significant contri-
bution to revitalize the entity when it put forward the “Luanda’s 
initiative”, a set of governmental events that would result in the 
7th Ministerial Meeting that occurred in the Angolan capital on 
June 18 and 19, 2007. The document presented at the end of the 
Meeting, besides revitalizing the preceding objectives, pleaded the 
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reform of the United Nations Security Council in order to make it 
more representative of the countries in development and a global 
commercial regime more equitable and fair. In this respect, the 24 
countries recognize the trading potential within the Zopacas and 
showed their disposition to strive for the increase of investment 
flows between the two margins of the South Atlantic. They have 
also stressed “inalienable rights” in the reservation of resources 
for research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful 
purposes (PENHA, 2011b). The map below highlights the 24 signa-
tory countries of the Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South 
Atlantic.
Figure 5: Signatory Countries of the Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the 
South Atlantic
Source: Penha (2015).
The nuclear issue revealed a change in the way of thinking 
related to nuclear energy, up to that moment seen with a lot of 
mistrust, because it could mask plausible intentions of develop-
ment for military purposes. Mistrust generated by the develop-
ment of Brazilian nuclear energy until recent times is an example 
of such an attitude, particularly on the part of the USA, in their 
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crusade to prevent the development of Iran’s nuclear program. In 
the context of the South Atlantic, mistrust is mitigated considering 
the fact that the countries of this region are signatory of the trea-
ties of Tlatelolco (in the case of South America) and Pelindaba (in 
the case of Africa).
Four months after the meeting in Luanda, the USA created the 
“United States Africa Command” or AFRICOM. In the documents 
about the new command there are five major interests related to 
the purpose of the American strategy for Africa identified: oil and 
global trading, maritime security, armed conflicts, terrorism, and 
diseases. Among the objectives: fight terrorism and piracy through 
naval exercises in cooperation with the Navies of riparian coun-
tries. The USA did not find the headquarters for this command yet 
because of the African countries’ reluctance in sheltering them, 
certainly due to mistrust in relation to their true objectives (PENHA, 
2011b).
On the south American side, a month after the announcement 
of the establishment of the South American Defense Council, inte-
grated to the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) in May 
2008, the USA announced the relaunching of the 4th fleet that had 
been out of activity since 1950. South American countries believe 
that behind this action there is an interest from the USA in object-
ing to the leftist regimes in the region and limit the expansion of the 
Brazilian maritime border of 350 miles where the huge oil reserves 
of the continental platform are found. In the two instances, the 
interest of the major power in inhibiting any initiative of estab-
lishment of power blocs in the South Atlantic is obvious. (PENHA, 
2011b).
In the 7th ZOPACAS Meeting, held in Montevideo, on January 
16, 2013, greater attention was paid to the topics concerning 
defense and security and this was made evident by the mere pres-
ence of the defense ministers of the member countries. It was the 
first time that they were called to a meeting of this organization 
since it was created in 1986. During the meeting, representatives 
of African nations recalled some of the serious problems that 
they have been facing nowadays like piracy, drug trafficking and 
ANGOLA`S GEOPOLITICAL DILEMMA:
BETWEEN THE AFRICAN “HEARTLAND” AND THE SOUTH ATLANTIC
TENSÕES MUNDIAIS, FORTALEZA, V. 12, N. 22, P. 177-202, 2016   |  199
international terrorism, opening the way to external intervention 
in the continent.
The Brazilian Defense Minister Celso Amorim, in his speech, 
pointed out the importance of extending cooperation in terms of 
defense among participating countries. He also stressed that the 
relevance of bilateral and multilateral initiatives in the area of 
defense, within the context of Zopacas, does not restrain direct 
action to the crimes that devastate the South Atlantic. “These same 
illegal activities may attract, in a negative way for our area,”the 
presence of external intervention”, as he warned. “If we do not 
take care of peace and security in the South Atlantic, others will 
do. And not in the way we want: with the view of countries in 
development that disavow any colonial or neo-colonial attitude” 
(ZOPACAS..., 2013).
In order to survive, Zopacas will largely depend on the ability of 
riparian countries to create a coalition in the South Atlantic leading 
to a common strategic dimension. Military presence put into prac-
tice by the USA, like AFRICOM and the 4th Fleet, though able to 
guarantee their own and European energetic security, contribute 
to shatter the lines of strategic action of South Atlantic countries. 
In this way, the development of a uniform strategic thought will be 
actually a complex task, even more considering the obsolescence 
of the navies of the countries in the region (PENHA, 2011b).
In spite of the difficulties, the revitalized ZOPACAS, may consti-
tute a privileged fórum for actions and reflections, not only in rela-
tion to the efforts of regional integration, but as a means of ensur-
ing defense and security for the south atlantic countries. Minister 
Celso Amorim`s proposal for the organization of actions to 
strengthen cooperation in defense matters is the first step in a long 
way to transform the South Atlantic in a security basin. A second 
step is to make ZOPACAS become the central articulation fórum 
among every regional organization of the whole South Atlantic, 
involving the MERCOSUL, CEEAC, CDAA-SADC and CEDEAO. The 
result would be the creation of an economic basin in the South 
Atlantic, having Angola and Brazil as key players in this new bloc 
of power in a post-globalized world. 
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7 CONCLUSION
Angola stands out as an amazing example of a South African 
country that was exploited during five centuries of colonial rule, 
suffered one of the longest and bloodiest civil wars in Africa7 and 
today is one of the most vibrant economies of the continent, a lot 
due to the revenue of oil exploration27.
The strategic partnerships established by the MPLA govern-
ment since the seventies are also remarkable aspects that help 
explain the assertive ways that resulted in territorial cohesion and 
establishment of peace as a permanent national objective. In this 
direction, it is possible to list the many alliances of the country 
according to its objectives: with Cuba to ensure the victory of the 
revolutionary process and assert itself geopolitically in the regional 
context; with Nigeria to project itself in the Gulf of Guinea`s oil 
region, through the GGC; with China to foster economic develop-
ment and the reconstruction of its infrastructure; and, with Brazil, 
to start economic and technical partnerships, besides consolidat-
ing the creation of a zone of peace and cooperation, origin of a 
future economic basin. 
“Angola, at the dawn of the 21st century, longs to be a model 
country in Africa and a regional power”, said president José 
Eduardo dos Santos, in a speech to the country`s diplomatic corps 
(FRANCISCO, 2013).  According to this perspective, asserting itself 
nationally, Angola`s mission would be to radiate the benefits of 
this union to the entire region.
In his book, “Angola – Potência Regional em Emergência”, 
published in 2011, the Luso-Angolan researcher, Eugênio da Costa 
Almeida, pursues an analysis of this possibility in context, within 
the integration processes led by the African Union. The key issue 
proposed by the author is to find out if there are possibilities of 
simultaneous coexistence of regional integrative processes and 
potentiation of Supervising-States. According to him, in order to 
make the interests of the regional powers compatible within the 
7  The “Congo War”, as it is known, has already killed six million people since its 
start, in 1994 and it destroyed the country’s infrastructure. See: <http://www.
defesaaereanaval.com.br/?p=30848>. Access on: 23 dez. 2016.
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African Union framework, and in this case, it will be possible “as 
long as it continues to be part of the interest of the major global 
powers, serving simultaneously to prevent the existence or the 
supremacy of a single potential actor in Africa” (ALMEIDA, 2011).
The Sub-Saharan African Supervising-States would be: South 
Africa – 51 million people and GDP of US$ 384 billion; Nigeria – 
170 million people and GDP of US$ 509 billion. The DRC – with 65 
million people and only US$ 18 billion GDP, goes through econom-
ic collapse because of the war and, therefore, is still uncertain. 
Even though possessing 2,345,409 km² (the largest territorial area 
in Sub-Saharan Africa), rich in energy potential and minerals that 
represent promising factors for the country’s development expect-
ed for the near future.
In quantitative and comparative terms, Angola – with 20 million 
people and GDP representing US$ 114 billion, advances as Central 
Africa’s regional power, occupying momentarily the vacancy left 
by the DRC. In this perspective, its condition as a continental power 
is due to the importance of its political-diplomatic influence on the 
three geopolitical African blocs, that is, Southern Africa, Central 
Africa and the Gulf of Guinea. On account of having common 
bonds, Angola would be able to foster greater articulation among 
the three regions.
An example would be the geopolitical resizing of the regional 
logistics. In this direction, the recent rehabilitation of the “Benguela 
Railway” by the Angolan government has been viewed, within 
the scope of SADC, as an important step to expedite the region-
al integration process. Having regular connection with the rail-
way systems of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and 
Zambia, it is possible, starting from the capital Lusaka, to arrive in 
the city of Beira (Mozambique) and Dar Es-Salaam (Tanzania), in 
the Indian Ocean (CAMINHO-DE-FERRO..., 2012). The creation of 
this land route connecting the Atlantic and the Pacific oceans, may 
represent a new map of Central-Southern Africa (the Rose-colored 
map), reversing the original plan: now the countries covered by 
the transportation network would be the ones to benefit from the 
results of the integration.
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Another important result of this new map would be the creation 
of a new geopolitical axis right in the African heartland to the detri-
ment of the maritime passages (Suez Canal and Cape of Good 
Hope). In this case, also reversing the harmful effects of fencing, 
isolation and colonization of the continent, that the construction 
of the Suez Canal helped to cause.
Starting from this geopolitical resizing, it would be possible to 
foresee the merger of the economic communities of Central and 
Southern Africa in one single organization, due to the fact that not 
only Angola but the DRC also are part of the two regional asso-
ciations, respectively the SADC and the ECCAS. This proposal, 
marked by the premises of the African Union in its search for the 
continental integration aimed by them, would benefit every coun-
try, through the unification of flows and of mechanisms of regional 
security, that would act in the prevention and the resolution of 
conflicts. This would allow, for instance, avoiding DRC’s isolation 
through its insertion in the regional productive system.
Angola has a mission – to accomplish its objective of national 
interest according to the desired African unity striving for peace, 
democracy and development (ALMEIDA, 2011). In this respect, 
Angola’s national interest is also manifested in the waters of the 
South Atlantic, through Angola’s prominence in the creation and 
development of the GGC and ZOPACAS. Once more, Angola knew 
how to assert its pivotal position, using its strategic way of maxi-
mizing synergies to fulfill multilateral interests and establish zones 
of influence, on the continent and at sea.
